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PRECAP: Beach v. State: Whether Retroactivity Will Render the 
Apple Ripe for Another Bite.   
 
E. Lars Phillips 
 
No. DC11-0723, OP 14-0685 
Montana Supreme Court 
 
Oral Argument: Wednesday, February 4th, 2015, at 9:30 AM in the 
Courtroom of the Montana Supreme Court, located in the Joseph P. 
Mazurek Justice Building, Helena, Montana.  
 
I. QUESTION PRESENTED 
 
Does the continued incarceration of Barry Beach, currently 
serving a term of 100 years in prison without the possibility of parole, for 
a crime, deliberate homicide, committed as a juvenile, v olate the Eighth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution or Art. II, § 22, of the Montana 
Constitution? 
 
II.  BACKGROUND 
 
On June 16, 1979, roughly four months after Barry Beach turned 
seventeen, Kimberly Nees was found dead near Poplar, Montana.1 On 
May 11, 1984, he was convicted of deliberate homicide and sentenced to 
one hundred years in prison without the possibility of parole.2 As Beach 
appears before the Montana Supreme Court for a third ime in the last 
decade, it is important to clearly define the scope f the question facing 
the Court. Beach is proceeding on writ of habeas corpus.3 As recognized 
by the Court in State v. Lott,4 the writ exists “to remedy ‘extreme 
malfunctions in the state criminal justice [system].’” 5 At its core level, 
the purpose of habeas corpus is not to correct errors of fact, but to cut 
directly to the question of whether or not the imprisonment of an 
individual “conform[s] with the fundamental requirem nts of the law.”6 
Therefore, the Court is not being asked to determine whether 
seventeen-year-old Barry Beach murdered Kimberly Nees on June 16, 
1979.7 As noted by former Justice Brian Morris, that question was 
                                         
1 State v. Beach, 705 P.2d 94, 97, 99 (Mont. 1985).  
2 Id. at 100.  
3 Mont. Code Ann. § 46–22–101 (2013). 
4 150 P.3d 337 (Mont. 2006). 
5 Id. at 342 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n. 5 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurri g)).  
6 Id. at 339 (quoting Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 402 (1963)).  
7 That question has been litigated extensively. See State v. Beach, 705 P.2d 94 (Mont. 1985); Beach 
v. Day, 913 P.2d 622 (Mont. 1996); Beach v. State (Beach I), 220 P.3d 667 (Mont. 2009); State v. 
Beach (Beach II), 302 P.3d 47 (Mont. 2013).  
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answered, likely for the final time, in State v. Beach (Beach II).8 Instead, 
the question to be decided is whether or not a district court’s 
discretionary act of sentencing a defendant, who committed homicide as 
a juvenile, to one hundred years in prison without the possibility of 
parole violates either the U.S. Constitution or theConstitution of the 
State of Montana.  
 
III.  SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
 
Beach frames the question before the Court as having two parts. 
First, does the district court’s perceived failure to consider his juvenile 
status as a mitigating factor during sentencing render the sentence 
unconstitutional? And, second, does the perceived failure to provide 
meaningful opportunity for release render the sentence unconstitutional? 
However, as shown by the State’s arguments, the question is not likely 
that simple. There are three distinct hurdles Beach must overcome to 
prevail on his petition: first, he must show that his petition is properly 
before the Court; second, he must show that the cas law, upon which he 
relies, is retroactive; and, third, he must show that he is entitled to relief 
under those cases. As each of these issues provide significant issues that 
may be addressed at oral argument, they will be briefly addressed in turn. 
 
A. Properly Before the Court 
 
Beach acknowledges that § 46–22–101(2), MCA, bars a 
petitioner who has “exhausted the remedy of appeal” from seeking relief 
under the writ of habeas corpus. He contends, however, that under State 
v. Lott the bar does not apply because the district court was without 
authority to impose the sentence.9 The State contends that, because the 
district court was acting within its authority when sentencing Beach, the 
sentence is not “facially invalid” and the Lott exception does not apply.10 
The State argues that because the sentence is not facially invalid, and 
because Beach has exhausted his remedy of appeal, th  pe ition should 
be dismissed outright. 11  
 
B. Juvenile Status 
 
Beach argues his sentence is unconstitutional becaus  the district 
court failed to take into account his status as a juvenile at the time of the 
                                         
8 Beach II, 302 P.3d at 87 (Morris, J., dissenting).  
9 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 7–8, Oct. 23, 2014, No. DA 11-0723. 
10 Attorney General’s Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 7, Nov. 28, 2014, No. DA 11-
0723. 
11 Attorney General’s Resp. Pet. Writ of Habeas Corpus 10.  
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crime.12 To support this argument, Beach cites a trio of recent U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions defining the boundaries of cruel and unusual 
punishment regarding juvenile defendants: Roper v. Simmons,13 Graham 
v. Florida,14 and Miller v. Alabama.15 Beach’s primary argument relies 
on Miller for the premise that the district court’s failure to “make [an] 
individualized determination” of his culpability in light of his juvenile 
status renders the sentence unconstitutional.16 To further support this 
point, Beach cites State v. Long,17 where the Ohio Supreme Court held 
that not only must the court specifically consider juvenile status as a 
mitigating factor when sentencing a person to life without parole, such 
consideration must be reflected in the record.18 Beach concludes that the 
district court’s failure to consider the Miller factors at sentencing renders 
his sentence unconstitutional.19  
In response, the State argues that Beach has misinterpreted not 
only Miller, but all the U.S. Supreme Court cases on which he reli s. The 
State contends, in relevant part: Roper, where the Court held sentencing 
juveniles to death was unconstitutional, does not apply because Beach 
was not sentenced to death20; Graham, where the Court held sentencing a 
juvenile to life without parole for a non-homicidal crime was 
unconstitutional, does not apply because Beach was convicted of 
homicide21; and, Miller, where the Court held that applying mandatory 
life without parole sentencing guidelines to juvenil  defendants was 
unconstitutional, does not apply because Beach’s sentence was 
discretionary.22 Further, the State notes that, even if Miller were 
applicable, the information considered by the district court would have 
led the court to the same conclusion had the Miller factors been 
considered.23  
 
C. Meaningful Opportunity for Release 
 
Alternatively, Beach argues that failure to provide a meaningful 
opportunity for release renders the sentence unconstitutional.24  In 
support of this proposition, Beach relies heavily on Graham and 
contends that “the trial court must impose a sentence that provides Beach 
                                         
12 Pet. Writ of Habeas Corpus 10.  
13 543 U.S. 551 (2005).  
14 560 U.S. 48 (2010).  
15 132 S. Ct. 2455 (U.S. 2012). 
16 Pet. Writ of Habeas Corpus 10.  
17 8 N.E.3d 890 (Ohio 2014). 
18 Id. at 893.  
19 Pet. Writ of Habeas Corpus 10.  
20 Att’y Gen.’s Resp. Pet. Writ of Habeas Corpus 10. 
21 Att’y Gen.’s Resp. Pet. Writ of Habeas Corpus 10–11.  
22 Att’y Gen.’s Resp. Pet. Writ of Habeas Corpus 11. 
23 Att’y Gen.’s Resp. Pet. Writ of Habeas Corpus 12–13.  
24 Pet. Writ of Habeas Corpus 15. 
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[with] a ‘meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated 
maturity and rehabilitation.’”25 The State responds that, even if Graham 
did apply, Beach has received meaningful opportunities for release.26 In 
support of that argument, the State notes that Beach h s come before the 
Clemency Board on four separate occasions.27  
 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
 
Beach III presents three, sequential questions: whether the 
Petition is properly before the Court; if so, whether the case law, upon 
which Beach relies, applies retroactively; and, if both of the previous 
questions are answered affirmatively, whether the relief sought in the 
Petition is warranted.  
 
A. Whether the Petition for Habeas Corpus is properly before the Court. 
 
As noted by the State, § 46–22–101(2), MCA, limits the 
availability of the writ of habeas corpus to persons who have not 
exhausted their remedy of appeal. This limitation is directly at odds with 
Art. II, § 19, of the Montana Constitution which states “[t]he privilege of 
the writ of habeas corpus shall never be suspended.” Beach III provides 
the Court with an opportunity to broaden the Lott exception, which 
provides the bar within § 46–22–101(2), MCA, can only be tolled for 
“facially invalid” sentences, to a more constitutionally sound 
interpretation by holding that the writ of habeas corpus may never be 
suspended. As both sides of this issue are clearly defined, it is likely that 
neither side will allocate much time to the question at oral arguments, 
opting instead to allow the Court to make that determination.  
 
B. Whether the Eighth Amendment cases apply retroactively. 
 
If the Petition is not barred by § 46–22–101(2), MCA, the Court 
may have the opportunity to reach a currently contested question: 
whether Miller or Graham have retroactive effect in Montana. Given the 
implications on the case, namely that Beach may not rely on the cases if 
they are not found to be retroactive, this question will likely be 
vigorously debated at oral argument.  
 
1. Whether Miller applies retroactively. 
 
At the federal level, the question of whether or not Miller is 
retroactive is hotly contested. Recently, the Seventh Circuit noted that 
                                         
25 Pet. Writ of Habeas Corpus 15 (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 74).   
26 Att’y Gen.’s Resp. Pet. Writ of Habeas Corpus 14–15.  
27 Att’y Gen.’s Resp. Pet. Writ of Habeas Corpus 14.  
2015 PRECAP: BEACH III 11 
 
this question has spurred a split among the Circuit Courts: the First, 
Third, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits have determined that certain “applicants 
. . . have made prima facie showings that Miller is retroactive,” while the 
Eleventh and Fifth Circuits have held that Miller is not retroactive.28 The 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has, on three separate occasions, 
expressly stated that it has not yet determined the question.29 Notably, in 
December of 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court granted cert in Toca v. 
Louisiana,30 to address the Circuit split over whether Miller applies 
retroactively.31 Even with the uncertainty in the federal courts, the 
Montana Supreme Court may be willing to follow the d termination of 
the high court in our sister State, Wyoming, which recently held the 
Miller rule to be retroactive.32  
 
2. Whether Graham applies retroactively. 
 
Similar to a determination regarding Miller, the Montana 
Supreme Court may reach the issue of whether Graham applies 
retroactively. While the U.S. Supreme Court has not yet answered that 
question, the Ninth and Fifth Circuits have held that Graham is 
retroactive.33  
 
C. Whether the relief sought under the Eight Amendment cases is 
warranted. 
 
If the Montana Supreme Court finds either Graham or Miller to 
be retroactive, the Court must determine whether th relief sought by the 
Petition is warranted. Due to the dissimilarity betw en the facts in Beach 
III and the holdings in Graham and Miller, this topic will likely be 
discussed at length at oral argument.  
 
1. Whether the relief sought under Miller is warranted.  
 
Here, the Court faces a two part question: first, whether Miller is 
applicable to Beach III, and, if so, whether the relief sought is warranted. 
As to the first question, the Court may look to a recent decision by the 
Ninth Circuit, Adams v. U.S.,34 where the Court held that Miller was 
inapplicable to a juvenile defendant “not sentenced to life without the 
                                         
28 Croft v. Williams, __ F.3d __, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 22283, 2 (7th Cir. 2014).  
29 Bell v. Uribe, 748 F.3d 857, 870 (9th Cir. 2013); Friedlander v. U.S., 542 Fed.Appx. 576, 577 (9th 
Cir. 2013); Adams v. U.S., 583 Fed.Appx. 658, 659 (9th Cir. 2014).  
30 Petition for writ of certiorari GRANTED, Dec. 12, 014, No. 14-6381.  
31 Petition for a writ of certiorari 2, Sep. 18, 2014, No. 14-6381 (citing Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460).   
32 State v. Mares, 335 P.3d 487, 491 (Wyo. 2014). 
33 Moore v. Biter, 725 F.3d 1184, 1190 (9th Cir. 2013).  
34 583 Fed.Appx. 658 (9th Cir. 2014). 
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possibility of parole pursuant to a mandatory sentencing scheme.”35 
Along similar lines, the Seventh Circuit recently refused to apply Miller 
where a juvenile petitioner had been subject to a discretionary, instead of 
mandatory, sentence of life without the possibility of parole.36 
If the Montana Supreme Court finds Miller to be applicable, the 
Court may look to recent Ninth Circuit decisions, Bell v. Uribe,37 and 
Friedlander v. U.S.,38 for instruction. In Bell, the Ninth Circuit held that 
Miller was not violated where a court had considered “both mitigating 
and aggravating factors under a sentencing scheme that affords discretion 
and leniency.”39 Similarly, in Friedlander, where a juvenile was 
sentenced to life in prison with a concurrent term of twenty years, the 
Ninth Circuit held that, even if Miller were retroactive, the claim was 
without merit as the Petitioner had not been sentenced to “life without 
parole,” as evidenced by his having “seen the parole board 
approximately 8 time[s].”40  
 
2. Whether the relief sought under G aham is warranted. 
 
Here, the Court faces a similar two part question: whether 
Graham is applicable to Beach III, and whether the relief sought is 
warranted. It bears noting that Beach’s reliance on Graham is tenuous at 
best. In Graham, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that “[a] State is not 
required to guarantee eventual freedom to a juvenile offender convicted 
of a nonhomicide crime. What the State must do, however, is give 
[defendants convicted of a nonhomicide crime] some aningful 
opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and 
rehabilitation.”41 Even though the Court explicitly limited the 
“meaningful opportunity” requirement to defendants convicted of 
nonhomicide crimes, Beach relies on Graham for the premise that the 




Beach III provides yet another bite at the apple for a persistent 
petitioner. While it is unlikely that the Court will find in favor of Beach, 
Beach III may give the Court an opportunity to clarify habeas corpus 
jurisprudence in Montana. First, the Court may find that, even if not 
applicable to Beach, both Miller and Graham are retroactive in Montana. 
                                         
35 Id. at 659 (quoting Bell, 748 F.3d at 869).  
36 Croft, __ F.3d at __, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 22283 at 3–4. 
37 748 F.3d 857 (9th Cir. 2013). 
38 542 Fed.Appx. 576 (9th Cir. 2013).  
39 Bell, 748 F.3d at 870.  
40 Friedlander, 542 Fed.Appx. at 577.  
41 Graham, 560 U.S. at 75.  
42 Pet. Writ of Habeas Corpus 15. 
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And second, Beach III may provide the Court with an opportunity to 
declare that the writ of habeas corpus may never be suspended, and bring 
§ 46–22–101(2), MCA, back in line with the Art. II, § 19, of the 
Montana Constitution. Regardless of the outcome, it bears repeating that 
the innocence of Barry Beach is not at issue in this current proceeding. 
Rather, the Court will be determining whether the Eighth Amendment, or 
Art. II, § 22, of the Montana Constitution, permits sentencing a 
defendant, who committed homicide as a juvenile, to one hundred years 
in prison without the possibility of parole.  
 
Attorneys for Petitioner, Barry A. Beach: Terrance L. Toavs, Law 
Offices of Terrance L. Toavs, Wolf Point, MT; Peter A. Camiel, Mair & 
Camiel, P.S., Seattle, WA. 
 
Attorneys for Respondent, State of Montana: Timothy C. Fox, Montana 
Attorney General, Helena, MT; Ralph J. Patch, Roosevelt County 
Attorney, Wolf Point, MT.  
 
